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THE VIRTUAL CLERK'S OFFICE: A PROPOSED MODEL
JUDGMENT LIEN ACT FOR THE COMPUTER AGE

Charles Shafer*
I

INTRODUCTION

Winning a money judgment is often just the beginning of the cred
itor's journey. The law places the burden on the judgment creditor to
find and obtain sufficient assets to satisfy the judgment. 1 But in at
tempting to satisfy judgments, a creditor faces a thicket of statutes,
court rules, and case law that have grown up over the last two centu
ries. 2 The basic rules arose when real property was the primary source
of wealth and, without phones or automobiles, public records through
out the state were not easily accessible. Nevertheless, except for inter
est accruing at a fairly moderate rate,S there is no penalty for a
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; Charles Shafer, Baltimore, MD.
Thanks to Lisa Lenderman for valuable research assistance.
1. Robert L. Haig & Patricia O. Kahn, Representing the Judgment Creditor, 16 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 1 (1992). For example the prime rate on corporate loans was 8.75% pm September 26,
1995. WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1995, at C21. A home equity loan is tied to and above the prime rate.
Timothy L. O'Brien, Prime-Rate Cut May Benefit Consumers, But Impact Now Appears Psycho
logical, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1995, at A2. Credit card rates are also tied to the prime rate and can
average about 6% above the prime rate. See Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Fees on Variable-Rate Credit
Cards Rise, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1995, at Cl.
2. Jeffrey, supra note 1, at Cl. See also Francis E. Stepnowski, Less Than Perfected: Uncer
tainty in IIlillOis Judgment Lien Law, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 33, 33-35 (1992).
3. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 685.010 (West 1987) (10%); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5
12-102(4)(b) (1989) (contract rate or 8%), 13-21-101 (personal injury actions: 9%); ILL. ANN.
STAT., ch. 735,115/2-1303 (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1994) (9%); MD. CODE ANN, CTS. & JUD.
FROC. § 11-107 (1994) (10%); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 5004 (McKinney 1992) (9%); VA. CODE
ANN. § 6.1-330.54 (Michie 1994) (9%). Interest in judgments obtained in United States Courts is
based on the rate of interest on one-year United States Treasury Bills. 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (1988).
The interest rate as of October 31, 1994 was only 6.06%. Interest on judgments is usually not
compounded. Similarly, some states have adopted variable interest rates. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 5-12-106(2)(a) (1989) (where judgment is appealed: "the rate of interest a commercial bank pays
to the federal reserve bank of Kansas City using a government bond. . . as security. . . is rounded
to the nearest full percent").
Such interest is simple interest, not compounded. Westbrook Y. Fairchild, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277,
280-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Lewis v. Stran-Steel Corp., 373 N.E.2d 714 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
However, the federal government and some states have provided for compounding post judgment
interest. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1961(b) (1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ S-12-102(4)(b), 5-12
106(2)(a), 13-21-101(1) (1989).
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debtor's failure to pay a judgment creditor. For example, debtors do
not have to fear imprisonment in the vast majority of cases. 4
This article addresses one aspect of the law regarding the satisfac
tion of judgments: when a creditor is determined to have a lien on
property of the debtor. The unnecessary cumbersomeness of the present
system, which limits the ability of creditors to promptly obtain a legally
cognizable interest in specific property, hampers creditors in preventing
the debtor's use, sale, or hypothecation of property that could be used
to satisfy their debts.5 This is particularly true of intangible property
and property where federal law or the law of sister states controls
transfers. Not only do judgment creditors face the risk that the debtor
will voluntarily dissipate or transfer assets, but also the risk that they
will be defeated by subsequent parties who deal with the debtor, be
come creditors, and are able to find assets. Possibly the most pernicious
of those subsequent creditors are the federal and state taxing authori
ties. The tax lien, once filed, locks in all personal and real property of
the debtor.a Bankruptcy also presents a serious difficulty for the judg
ment creditor. If the debtor files for bankruptcy before the creditor can
locate personal property of the debtor, the creditor (despite having ob
tained a judgment) has no greater priority than all of the unsecured
creditors of the debtor. If the judgment creditor locates personal prop
erty and obtains a lien on that property shortly before the date that the
debtor files a Bankruptcy petition, the creditor's lien can be avoided as
a preference. 7 Even where a debtor files a Chapter 11 petition and
maintains control of the business as a debtor in possession, the debtor
can still use the preference section to avoid the creditor's lien.s
This article proposes that the computer systems currently being
introduced to automate court systems around the country serve as the
It should be noted that the interest afforded is probably not comparable to the interest that the
market would dictate for a similar risk.
4. Most states, by constitution or statute, prohibit imprisonment for debt. See. e.g., ALA.
CONST. art. I, § 20; CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 501 (West 1979). However, there are exceptions for
support obligations or particular types of conduct such as fraud. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I,
§ 17 (civil arrest for absconding debtors); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 18 (fraud); ARK. CONST. art. 2,
§ 16 (fraud); MD. CONST. art. III, § 38 (support obligations); NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 14 (fraud, libel
or slander).
5. For example, a security interest in personal property is subject to a judicial lien. U.C.C.
§ 9-301(1)(b). The judicial lien might not arise until execution. See infra note 9.
6. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 6323(a) (1988); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. §§ 13-805, 13
808 (1988).
7. Unless the creditor is an insider, a lien obtained within 90 days preceding the bankruptcy
filing is an avoidable preference. II U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988).
8. II U.S.C. § 1l07(a) (1988).
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vehicle for the implementation of major reforms in the substantive and
procedural law regarding judicial liens. The most significant change
would involve the creation of statewide judgment liens on virtually all
of the property of the debtor. This article will explore how the proposed
system might deal with various types of property and particular third
parties, and how to solve some of the transitional problems involved in
adopting such a system. The changes proposed are incorporated in a
Model Judgment Lien Act (MJLA) which is set forth in the Appendix
of this article. It is hoped that the MJLA makes clear precisely how
the rules discussed in the article would operate.

II.

THE PRESENT SYSTEM

Although judgment creditors are entitled to have real property
sold in order to satisfy their judgments, their priority vis-a-vis other
creditors and purchasers is usually based upon the date when they ob
tained a lien on the specific piece of property.9 Since the creditor must
do little more than actually obtain the judgment and (possibly) see that
an appropriate filing is made, the lien is usually referred to as a judg
ment lien. 10 In some states, the judgment creditor need do nothing at
all to obtain the lien on all real property in the county in which the
judgment was rendered. l l Often even in those states, only the judg
ments of certain courts automatically create liens. 12 In other states, the
creditor always may have to affirmatively file or docket the judgment
with the court or in the land records to obtain a lien. 13 In some jurisdic
tions, judgments from small claims courts may never become a lien on
real property.14 Once the judgment creditor has obtained a judgment
lien on property in the county in which the judgment was rendered, the
creditor may obtain a lien on the debtor's property in other counties by
recording the judgment in the appropriate office or court of those coun
9. See, e.g., N.Y. CIY. PRAC. L. & R. 5203(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
10. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 845 (6th ed. 1990).
11. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 624.23 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CTS.
& JUD. PROC. § 11-402 (1993).
12. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-402(b) (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 511.350(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
13. See CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 697.310 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); COLO. REY. STAT.
§§ 13-52-102 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-380a (West 1991) Uudg
ment creditor must specify the property); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 511.350(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994); N.Y.
CIY. PRAC. L. & R. 5203(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994). In 1967, Tennessee, which had not required
any filing by the judgment creditor, changed its procedure to require such a filing. See TENN. CODE
ANN. § 25-5-101(b) (1980 & Supp. 1994).
14. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 482.365 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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ties. lIS The basis for the territorial limitation on judgment liens is no
doubt that it would be unfair for someone buying land in one county to
have to check the court records in other counties. lS
Although three states (Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi) do ex
tend the judgment lien to personal property as well as real property,!':
most states require more for the creditor to obtain a lien on the
debtor's personal property. The lien on personal property is typically
called an execution lien because the creditor must initiate the execu
tion process, that is the process involved in the seizure and sale of the
property, to obtain a lien. ls The procedure consists of the following: (1)
the creditor obtains a writ of execution l9 from the court clerk and de
livers that writ to the sheriff; (2) the sheriff then locates and either
seizes the property or leaves it where located and attaches a notice on
or near the property (and may take other steps to secure the property);
(3) the sheriff then sells the property.20 States vary with regard to
whether the lien is created as of the date of the delivery of the
paperwork to the sheriff21 or as of the date of the seizure of the prop
erty,22 with the latter being the majority rule. Some states have re
cently instituted procedures whereby judgment creditors can secure
IS.

See MD. CODE ANN., Cn. &

JUD.

PROC. § 1I-402(c) (1993).

16. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor Implement & Vehicle Co., 195 S.W.
762 (Tenn. 1917).
17. ALA. CODE § 6-9-211 (1990), reads in part: "Every judgment, a certificate of which has
been filed as provided in section 6-9-210, shall be a lien in the county where filed on all property of
the defendant which is subject to levy and sale under execution . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
GA. CODE AN1\. § 9-12-80 (Supp. 1993), reads in part: "All judgments obtained in the superior
courts, justice of the peace courts, or other courts of this state shall be of equal dignity and shall
bind all the property, both real and personal, from the date of such judgments except as otherwise
provided in this Code." (Emphasis added.)
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-191 (1989): "A judgment so enrolled shall be a lien upon and bind all
the property of the defendant within the county so enrolled, from the rendition thereof . . ." (Em
phasis added.)
18.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 568 (6th ed. 1990).

19. The nomenclature and specifics vary. For example, in Illinois, the creditor must deliver a
"certified copy" of the judgment. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, 11 5/12-111 (Smith-Hurd 1992).

20. See Haig & Kahn, supra note 1. at 24-25.
21. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, 11 5/12-111 (Smith-Hurd 1992); Robinson v. Wright, 9 P.2d 618
(Colo. 1932). In states where the lien arises upon delivery of the writ to the sheriff, that lien only
applies to property upon which the sheriff actually levies before the return date of the writ. First
Nat'l Bank of Center v. Monte Vista Hardware Co., 226 P. 154, 156 (Colo. 1924).
22. See CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 697.710 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); IOWA R CIv. PROC.
626.33 (Supp. 1994).
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liens on personal property by a filing similar to a filing to perfect a
security interest under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 2s
The present system often makes the acquisition of an execution
lien (and thus the ability to limit the debtor's ability to use, sell, or
hypothecate the property or to protect the property through bank
ruptcy) dependent upon both the creditor's ability to locate the prop
erty and to convince the sheriff to seize the property. A sheriff may not
be willing to do so if she cannot be sure of the debtor's title, or if
seizure would be impractical or dangerous. 24 In addition, the creditor
may have to provide the funding necessary for maintaining or storing
the seized property until it has been sold. 26
Moreover matters are complicated further when the property in
volved is intangible, such as stock, notes or intellectual property. Intan
gible property is not often the type of property on which a sheriff may
execute. Therefore, even if state statutory schemes allow for the even
tual sale of such property to satisfy the judgment creditor's claim, the
creditor's priority may be based only on the date of the sale or court
proceeding ordering the transfer of such property.2S

III

PROPOSED MODEL JUDGMENT LIEN ACT: THE VIRTUAL
CLERK'S OFFICE

The proposed statute is based on the premise that it will soon be
possible for everyone to go to one office to obtain information about the
status of a party's interest in property. That one office will not exist in
23. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 697.510 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (limited to specified com
mercial property); CONN. GEN. STAT, ANN, § 52-355a (West 1991) (limited to nonconsumer judg
ments); ME, REV, STAT, ANN, tit. 14, § 4651-A (West Supp. 1994).
24. California explicitly provides that the levying officer shall only demand delivery of the
property of the judgment debtor and shall make no further effort to obtain custody. The judgment
creditor must then apply to the court for an order directing the levying officer to "seize the property
in the private place." Then if the property is not voluntarily delivered the levying officer may use
force unless there is a substantial risk of serious bodily injury. CAL. CIV, PROC, CODE § 699.030
(West 1987).
25. See Haig & Kahn, supra note 1, at 44-49. The following hypothetical illustrates one of the
problems presented to judgment creditors: Judgment creditor A obtained a judgment and writ of
execution on January 1, but was unable to convince the sheriff to execute on Debtor's inventory.
Creditor B obtained a judgment on February I, and was successful in convincing the sheriff to
execute. Under the laws of Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi, A would still be entitled to the pro
ceeds of the property because he had priority under those states' laws. Alternatively, in other states,
where a lien is created upon execution by the sheriff, B would have priority.
26. See Cherie L. Lieurance, Judgment Creditors' Access To Intellectual Property
Rights-Is Simple Execution In Sight?, 7 WHITTIER L. REV, 375 (1985).
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any particular location but will exist in "cyberspace."27 The office will
be a "virtual clerk's ojJice."28 Many state and federal courts have al
ready begun the process of making the records of each court's docket
available to computer searches. 29 Ideally these filing systems will con
27. "Cyberspace" commonly refers to the information sent and received through the use of
computer networks. See Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. PITT, L.
REV, 993, 994 (1994).
28. "Virtual clerk's office" refers to an electronic service which performs tasks which to date
have been performed in a clerk's office. For purposes of this article, I am referring to the service of
making available records of court proceedings. Of course, other functions of clerks' offices can and
will be available electronically:
The first element of the virtual courthouse is already a reality in some locations. A recent
amendment to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits electronic filing of
papers. Filing of scanned images of documents is already widespread and could become ubiq
uitous within a few years. Already in many federal and state courts, the docket is accessible
by computer from beyond the courthouse doors. Courts of appeals and supreme court opin
ions are now available on-line in some courts without charge, and other innovations are on the
horizon, Most steps to the virtual clerk's office have been accomplished with little controversy,
because their efficiencies are plain and external costs are minimal.
Gordon Bermant & Winton D. Woods, Real Questions About the Virtual Courthouse, 78 JUDICA
TURE 64, 64-65 (1994).
29. Information technology is on the rise in court systems across the country. It has been
estimated that automation can cut tim~ and financial resources spent on the lawsuit process enor
mously by allowing expedition of the litigation process, case management, and statistical reporting at
the appellate level. See Robert Anderson et aI., The Impact of Information Technology on Judicial
Administration: A Research Agenda for the Future, 66 S. CAL. L. REV, 1761, 1764 (1993). See also
John G. Sakellaris, Computerized Access to Court Information, 23 MD, 8.J. 35 (1990). Clearly,
automating the court system is the most efficient means in which to handle the ever-expanding
caseloads of the courts, ld.
The public can access judgment information from federal district courts and bankruptcy courts
through the Public Access to Court Electronic Research System (PACER). Michael Webb, Elec
tronic Access to Court Records: What's Available Now and What's Coming, AM. BANKR. INST, J.,
12-17 (July/Aug. 1995); Robert Ambrogi, Finding Court Decisions on the Internet, 38 RES, GESTAE
44 (June, 1995).
Many states have already begun the process of automating all aspects of the court system, from
charging a plaintiff with a cause of action, to recording a rendered judgment. See Kevin P. Kilpa
trick, Automation In Courts On the Rise, 14 NAT'L L.J. 39 (1991), Often, court computer systems
are accessible to anyone who has a personal computer, a standard modem and the appropriate
software, Such communications software which provides access to LEXIS/NEXIS and/or Westlaw
shall suffice to connect with many court computer systems. See Sakellaris, supra, at 36.
In the Maryland state court system, the Judicial Information System ("JIS") is a computerized
service which allows attorneys to communicate with the court clerks, to file and receive motions and
other documents which expedite the litigation process enormously, and to avoid unnecessary trips to
the courthouse. Id. at 35, 41. Another function of JIS is to provide the user with information on
judgments and liens in particular counties, given the debtor's name and other pertinent data, One
may be connected to JIS at a modest initial fee of fifty dollars, plus twenty-five cents per minute of

use.Id.
In the Massachusetts state court system, a new computer system has been implemented in the
superior courts of the three most populated counties, which accounts for over one half of the state's
caseload. Telephone Interview with Richard Duggan, Director of Information Systems at the Office
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tain a record of all suits filed, pre-judgment attachments, lis pendens
notices, judgments and renewal of judgments from all state and federal
of the Chief Administrative Justice, Boston, Massachusetts (Sept. 29, 1994). Under this system,
cases are processed from the filing of the first pleading to the recording of the judgment. Individuals
may access lien information from terminals by searching for the person's name and/or docket num
ber.Id.
Similarly, in the Mississippi state court system, the most densely populated counties, Harrison,
Hines, Renken, Lauderdale and Jones Counties, have implemented a computer system which auto
matically records judgments. Telephone Interview with Ronald Simms, Data Processing Manager of
the Mississippi Supreme Court, Jackson, Mississippi (Sept. 30, 1994). The advantage of Missis
sippi's computer system is that it is a common system used by the various counties, thus allowing
cross-referencing throughout the state without the problems of conflicting systems. Id.
In the New York state court system, the more densely populated regions have a computer sys
tem which stores judgment liens in a database which can be accessed by anyone from the
public-access terminals. Telephone Interview with Diane Thompson, Employee at the Data Process
ing Office of Court Administration, Troy, New York (Sept. 21, 1994).
Similarly, in the Iowa state court system, automation is currently being implemented through
out the state. Telephone Interview with Larry Murphy, Director of the Court Administrator's Office,
Des Moines, Iowa (Sept. 21, 1994). Thus far, thirty of the ninety-nine counties have installed a
database of judgment liens which may be accessed by credit unions, banks, attorneys, private citi
zens, etc. from public-access terminals. Id. Connection to personal computers, via modems, is also
emerging. [d.
The Alabama state court system is also implementing a statewide database for case processing
and management. Telephone Interview with John O'Sullivan, Director of the Judicial Data Center of
the Administrative Office of the Courts, Montgomery, Alabama (Sept. 29, 1994). Thus far, all but
four states have implemented the system. [d.
There are several state court systems, such as those in Maine and South Dakota, which have
implemented statewide criminal docketing computer systems to manage the heavy caseloads, but
have limited systems in the civil courts. Telephone Interview with Scott Clark, Purchasing Manager
at the Administrative Office of the Courts, Portland, Maine (Sept. 30, 1994); Telephone Interview
with Pamela R. Templeton, Planning and Systems Officer at the Unified Judicial System, Pierre,
South Dakota (Sept. 30, 1994).
In California, automation is being developed at many stages of a lawsuit: police officers carrying
hand-held computers from which they issue citations; individuals paying fines or fees on interactive
kiosks; attorneys electronically filing motions and documents with the court; criminal offenders being
arraigned through interaction between the court and the prison via video camera; and evidence being
stored and re-shown on computer to save time in presenting the original evidence twice. See Ander
son et aI., supra, at 1761-69. However, in the area of judgment liens, the data is usually not re
corded, despite the available technology. Telephone Interview with Peggy Hawkins, Superior Court
Systems Specialist, Martinez, California (Sept. 30, 1994). In many of the less populated counties,
there is no computer system at all and the information is stored manually. Id.
There are still some states, such as Georgia, which have nearly no automation in their court
systems, and the case processing and data storage is performed manually. Telephone Interview with
Eric John, Director at the Council of Juvenile Court Judges, Marietta, Georgia (Sept. 29, 1994).
The most common problems which keep states from implementing any type of automation in the
court systems are a lack of state funding and political opinions which oppose innovation. For these
reasons, it is necessary for a state to create an agency which can organize the effort to create a
common system and solicit the necessary allocation of funds.
Thus far, most court automation systems streamline the criminal systems and litigation process,
and to some extent, the trial stage. This article merely suggests providing for a practical, effective
method for the final stage of a lawsuit, the enforcement of a judgment.
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courts throughout the state. It will not be necessary that these records
al1 be stored in one place or all be contained in one database. Addi
tional software could tie all the disparate systems together so that what
may appear to be one search by the end user in fact will be a search of
all databases throughout the state. so Any person could search these
records in any courthouse throughout the state, or from any personal
computer with a modem and the appropriate software. Unofficial
records of judgments and U.C.c. security interests already are availa
ble on LEXIS31 and Westlaw. 32
The availability of the virtual clerk's office will permit a substan
tial revision of the rules regarding the priority of the claims of judg
ment creditors. The proposed MJLA, which is set forth in the Appen
dix, is designed to take advantage of that possibility and to illustrate
how to deal with complications that may arise.

A.

Treatment of Various Types of Property
J.

Real Property

Establishment of the virtual clerk's office would make it possible
for a party to obtain judgment information by traveling to only one
office and that office might very well be on her desk. s3 Therefore, there
no longer would be any justification for limiting the scope of liens to
the county of the judgment. All liens on real property therefore should
be statewide. This would eliminate the delay and expense caused by the
30. The fact that it may be necessary to harmonize different county and federal systems cre
ated prior to the adoption of the system proposed in this article will not present insurmountable
technical problems. Fortunately, the user's software can be designed to do all the work of searching
each data base for the names requested and provide one report to the user. From the user's point of
view it will appear as if she is accessing one central database.
31. LEXIS provides unofficial judgment records for state courts in particular counties of Ari
zona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Montana, Missouri, Nevada, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. LEXIS
provides U.C.C. filings for California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania
and Texas.
32. Westlaw carries a Prentice Hall service which provides civil judgments from California,
Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Washington and Texas. Westlaw provides U.C.C. filings from Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Iowa, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah and Washington.
33. Since it would be unfair to require all citizens to have modems and computers, MJLA
requires that a terminal be available in all courthouses in the state. MJLA § I!. Even where states
choose not to make the court records accessible to "dial up" searches, the reforms envisioned in
MJLA are still achievable where the terminal in each courthouse can access all counties of the state.
MJLA § 11.
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creditor's need to be sure liens are filed in all counties in which a
debtor may have property.

2.

"State Regulated" Tangible Personal Property

The MJLA's effect on personal property will be even more signifi
cant. First, as with liens on real property, judgment liens would attach
to personal property throughout the state. 34 As indicated previously,
Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi36 already provide for judgment
liens to be liens on personal property in the county of the rendering
court, and several states provide a mechanism for a statewide U.C.C.
type filing of judgments which create liens on particular types of
property.36
Second, MJLA would make the lien arise upon judgment, not
upon execution or delivery of a writ to the sheriff, as is the case in the
vast majority of states. This would have a profound effect on secured
creditors, purchasers and other judgment lienors. Although this would
constitute a reversal of fortunes for the secured creditor, it is not ineq
uitable to expect secured creditors to check the court filing system,
since they already must check Article 9 filings. Purchase money se
cured creditors who had advanced credit or money to enable the debtor
to purchase property would be protected under MJLA, because the
debtor would not own the property if it were not for the extension of
credit which is secured by the property,37 and the judgment creditor
has not relied on the debtor's ownership of the property. For the latter
reason, the proposed protection of purchase money secured creditors is
broader than that in the V.C.C. which requires prompt filing.38
Basing priority to personal property on the date of judgment sig
nificantly alters the relative rights of judgment creditors themselves by
reversing the current rule in almost all states, which is to accord prior
ity to the first creditor to execute on the property or the first creditor to
34. Execution, the procedure for the actual sale of personal property to satisfy the claims of
judgment lien creditors, would remain the same. It is conceded that the actual execution process may
still be as arduous as it is currently. On the other hand, there are many attractive features which
ease the procedural onus that the creditor currently endures while enforcing of a judgment, such as
(l) automatic creation of the lien, thus eliminating the need to register the judgment with the clerk
of the court; (2) development of a comprehensive lien on all property, thus eliminating the distinc
tion in rules between real and personal property; and (3) establishment of immediate priority over
subsequent creditors and purchasers.
35. See supra note 17.
36. See supra note 23.
37. MJLA § 4(a)(iii).
38. See V.C.C. §§ 9-301(2),9-312(3), (4) (1995).
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get the writ to the sheriff. Presumably, the current rule rewards dili
gence by creditors. 89 It also rewards creditors who are more familiar
with the whereabouts of the debtor's assets. Nevertheless, under the
proposed statute the judgment creditor will still have an incentive to be
diligent. for two reasons. First, postjudgment interest added to the debt
does not sufficiently reward the creditor for the delay in collection. 40
Second, the property might disappear or depreciate. Junior judgment
creditors will also have an incentive to inform senior creditors of prop
erty because the junior judgment creditor then will be closer to satis
faction of her judgment. Moreover, this is supported by the V.C.c.,
which dictates a similar result for competing security interests."l
Along with secured creditors and judgment creditors, third parties
who may purchase or lease property from the debtor will also be ef
fected by the creation of the judgment lien on personal property!2
When the law regarding liens on personal property developed, it may
have been considered too onerous a burden on third parties to make
their right to personal property depend on records in a courthouse in
the county seat!8 But all states now impose that burden on third par
ties through the use of the V.C.C. filing system for personal property.
Obviously there are situations where it would be unfair to third parties
to requir~ such a search.
Yet, the ability to make judgment lien searches easily available at
the virtual clerk's office should be kept in mind in distinguishing those
third parties who genuinely deserve protection and those who do not.
For example, it will never be appropriate to expect a consumer pur
chaser to conduct a judgment lien search, but it would be appropriate
for those engaging in large transactions and for business purchasers to
do so. MJLA illustrates how those exceptions can be made. For exam
ple, any consumer purchase would be excluded!4 Also, all business
39.

WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & PIERRE R. LOISEAUX. DEBTOR CREDITOR RELATIONS 53-54

(2d ed. 1979).
40. See supra note 3.
41. V.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1995).
42. Although not a purchaser, in many states an "artisan" who retains possession of the
debtor's property has priority over previously perfected security interests. It would be unfair to ex
pect the repairer of equipment or the dry cleaner to conduct a search for a possible financing state
ment. Moreover, the repair presumably adds value to the property at least sufficient to cover the cost
of repair. For these reasons, the proposed judgment lien on personal property also should be subject
to artisan's liens. MJLA § 4(a)(vii).
43. HAWKLAND & LOISEAUX, supra note 39.
44. MJLA §§ 4(a)(ii) + I (g)(v).
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purchases for less than $5,000 would be protected. 411 Where businesses
make purchases of a greater amount, even if purchasing from a
merchant who deals in goods of the kind, it is fair that they either
check the records or take the risk that the property is subject to a lien.
Similarly, the proposed statute provides protection for purchasers of
property for which state law provides a filing system for all transfers
(as opposed to the V.C.C. filing system which is only for security inter
ests).46 The proposed statute distinguishes between consumer purchases
of such property47 and business purchasers who are only protected
where the purchase is for less than $5,000. 48 Finally, because the pro
posed statute treats lessees of property as purchasers, it provides simi
lar protections and risks for lessees. 49 Despite making the above excep
tions from the scope of the judgment lien, the lien would not be
avoidable by the trustee or debtor in possession in bankruptcy since the
lien is superior to subsequent judgment liens.IIO
The creation of a judgment lien on personal property and tbe es
tablishment of an easily accessible recording system would aid creditors
in preventing debtors from selling and hypothecating property, and
would reward the first creditors to proceed against the debtor. In addi
tion, the proposed system helps those debtors who can overcome short
term financial distress by making it easier for creditors who have judg
ments to negotiate with debtors while at the same time preserving their
priority. Currently that is not possible: the creditor takes some risk if,
to give the debtor a chance to satisfy the judgment voluntarily, the
creditor does not have the property seized quickly. Where the creditor
refrains from selling property, subsequent creditors may be able to strip
45. MJLA §§ 4(a)(ii) & I (g)(i). Note that the protection provided the judgment lien creditor
under my proposal is greater than that provided the secured creditor under V.C.C. § 9·307. This is
only the case where the sale is a buyer in the ordinary course and a commercial purchase is involved.
The reason for the difference is that the secured creditor who voluntarily deals with a merchant can
be expected to monitor the merchant's sales and probably wants the merchant to be able to continue
selling inventory. However, the judgment lien creditor may not be aware of the debtor's business and
probably does not want the debtor to continue disposing of property. The judgment lien creditor
wants to get the debtor's attention. If large commercial purchasers will not buy from the debtor, the
debtor is more likely to pay to the judgment creditor.
46.

MJLA §§ 4(a)(ii) & 1(g)(iii) & (iv).

47.

MJLA §§ 4 & I (g)(ii).

48.

MJLA §§ 4(a)(ii) & l(g)(iii).

49.

The definition of "buy" includes leasing. MJLA § I(a).

50. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1), (2) (1988); MJLA § 4.
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the original creditor of priority due to the failure to execute promptly. 51
MJLA will allow judgment creditors to maintain priority to personal
property in the same way that judgment lien creditors can for real
property, and secured creditors can for both real and personal property.

3.

Federally Regulated Tangible Personal Property: Aircraft

Although the proposed statute purports to govern transfers of title
of all tangible personal property, it cannot conflict with federal law to
the extent that it controls title to such property. For example, with re
gard to airplanes, federal law provides:
Until a conveyance, lease, or instrument executed for security pur
poses that may be recorded under section 44107(a)(1) or (2) of this title
is filed for recording, the conveyance, lease, or instrument is valid only
against
(1) the person making the conveyance, lease, or instrument;
(2) that person's heirs and devisees; and
(3) a person having actual notice of the conveyance, lease, or
instrument. 1S2

The United States Supreme Court has held that a similar provi
sion prohibits all transfers of title to aircraft from having validity
against third parties unless a written instrument memorialized the
transfer and has been recorded with the Federal Aviation Administra
tion. 58 Nevertheless, once instruments are recorded, state law rules de
termine the priorities among competing recorded interests. 54 This ap
parent contradiction can be understood by viewing the recording
51. HAWKLAND & LOlSllAUX, supra note 39; Century Pipe Supply Co. v. Empire Factors
Corp., 153 N.E.2d 298, 302 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958); Robinson v. Wright, 9 P.2d 618 (CoL 1932); see
Ill. Inc. v. Margolis, 296 A.2d 412 (Md. 1972), and the cases referred to therein.
52. 49 U.s.C. 44108 (1995).
53. Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 402 U.S. 406 (1983). The prior statute read: "No con
veyance or instrument ... shall be valid. . . against any person. . . until such conveyance or other
instrument is filed for recordation in the office of the [Federal Aviation Administration]." 49 U.S.C.
§ 1403 (1988).
54. Phi/ko, 402 U.S. at 412-13. ("We are inclined to agree with this . . . .); South Shore
Bank v. Tony Mat, Inc., 712 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1983). "No conveyance or instrument ... shall be
valid . . . against any person . . . until such conveyance or other instrument is filed for recordation
in the office of the [Federal Aviation Administration]." This rule appears to be more explicitly stated
in the revised statute. 49 U.s.C. § 44108(c): The validity of a conveyance, lease, or instrument that
may be recorded under § 44107 of this title is subject to the laws of the State, the District of
Columbia, or the territory or possession of the United States at which the conveyance, lease, or
instrument is delivered, regardless of the place at which the subject of the conveyance, lease, or
instrument is located or delivered. If the conveyance, lease, or instrument specifies the place at which
delivery is intended, it is presumed that the conveyance, lease, or instrument was delivered at the
specified place.
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system as a congressional reaction to the problems created by the
highly mobile nature of aircraft. Absent a single filing location, pur
chasers and secured parties would need to file in many jurisdictions to
perfect their interests and would need to make a title search in all
states to be certain there was no prior recorded interest. 55 Therefore,
Congress created a central filing system, leaving the effect of the filing
to the states. 56
The following hypothetical illustrates the consequences. C obtains
a judgment against D on January 1. C has the writ of execution (or
other appropriate document) delivered to the sheriff on January 15. On
February 1, S obtains a security interest in D's airplane and records
the security interest with the FAA. On February 15, the sheriff seizes
D's airplane based on Cs writ. C subsequently has some documentation
establishing the seizure filed with FAA.
In a state where the execution lien arises on the date that the writ
is given to the sheriff, C will probably defeat S. This result is not guar
anteed. A court could hold that the federal filing system controls both
recordation and priorities. 57 In that case, the result would be the same
as in the states where the execution lien arises upon attachment. But,
assuming the priority is based on state law, the judgment creditor's
priority is still dependent upon getting the writ to the sheriff and locat
ing the plane prior to the expiration of the writ. Moreover, as a result
of the delay in recordation, even if C eventually wins, others (such as
S) may have dealt with D in reliance on the lack of any recordation.
This is obviously bad for S, but it is also bad for C. Cs ability to
convey good title is in question and C will incur expenses defending
that title. In a state where the execution lien arises upon attachment,
the answer is clearer: C will be defeated by S. In those states which
provide for the U.C.C.-type filing of judgment liens, the statutes do not
provide for recording in federal filing systems and are expressly limited
to the types of property for which state filings are appropriate. 58
The MJLA helps the judgment creditor. First, the lien arises upon
judgment. It is not necessary first to locate a plane or the sheriff.
55. Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp., 681 F.2d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 1982).
56. [d. at 372.
57. At least one case has held that the federal statute controls priorities. In re Cone, 11 B.R.
925 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1981). That case was criticized in Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics
Corp., 681 F.2d 365, 369 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982). Cone was decided prior to Phi/ko, 402 U.S. at 406;
but note the rather weak language of Phi/ko.
58. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 697.530 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-355a (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT tit. 14, § 46S1-A (West Supp. 1994),
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Rather, the notice (in the above hypothetical) could be filed with the
FAA as early as January 2. Despite the fact that the rules for transfer
may require actions taken outside the state, the plane clearly is within
the definition of property,69 and the proposed statute provides for a doc
ument which can be filed to record the transfer. eo Upon the Secretary's
receiving of the application for registration, the lien would become a
valid transfer. e1

4.

Intangible Property: Securities

Intangible personal property has always presented somewhat of a
problem for judgment creditors. Although state statutes indicate that
all personal property is subject to enforcement, it is not always clear
how an executing officer seizes such property.e2 Often creditors must
resort to a supplementary procedure to obtain control over such prop
erty.es Yet in contradistinction to the times when the law of judicial
liens originated, intangible personal property is often the most signifi
59. MJLA § I (I).
60. MJLA § 9. The judgment creditor could request that this order be entered at the same
time as the judgment.
61. Farina v. South Shore Bank, 25 B.R. 411 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982).
62. Some intangibles (such as negotiable warehouse receipts, negotiable instruments, and se
curities) have become so identified with a writing that seizure of the paper itself has long constituted
seizure of the obligation it memorializes. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 7-602 (warehouse receipts). With the
exception of the treatment of some transfers of certificated securities, MJLA respects transfers of
those documents despite the presence of the lien. MJLA § 1(g) (vii).
63. See. e.g., MD. R 2-651; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-52-102(4)(b) (West 1989 & Supp.
1994) ("All goods and chattels, lands, tenements, and real estate . . . are liable to sale on execu
tion."). Stepnowski, supra note 2, at 43-52.
In California "all property of the judgment debtor is subject to enforcement of a money judg
ment." CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 695.010 (West 1987). And "all property that is subject to enforce
ment of a money judgment . . . is subject to levy under a writ of execution." CAL CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 699.710 (West 1987). The judgment creditor may seek a court order requiring the judgment
debtor to turn over "evidence of title to property." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 699.040 (West 1987).
The judgment creditor may institute an examination proceeding. ld. § 708.110. Service upon the
judgment debtor of the order to attend the procedure "creates a lien on the personal property of the
judgment for a period of one year from the date of the order unless extended or sooner terminated
by the court." CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 708.110 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995). At the conclusion of
the proceeding the judge may order that the judgment debtor's interest in the property be applied
toward the satisfaction of the judgment. "Such an order creates a lien on the property. . .." CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 708.205 (West 1987). A judgment creditor may also move for the appointment
of a receiver. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 564 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995). The receiver's powers in
clude the power "to make transfers." CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 568 (West 1987). Although the
availability of other remedies does not, in and of itself, preclude tbe use of a receivership, the trial
court "must consider the availability and efficacy of other remedies in determining the whether to
employ the extraordinary remedy of a receivership." City & County of San Francisco v. Daley, 20
Cal. Rptr. 2d 256, 263 (Cl. App. 1st Dis!., 1993).
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cant property which the judgment debtor owns. The major change
worked by the proposed statute is the complete separation of the proce
dure for actually selling the property from the determination of the
priority of the various parties with interests in the property. The pro
posed statute makes no change in the former, but, with regard to the
latter, the MJLA makes clear that the judgment creditor's priority is
based on the date of judgment. Since intangible property is probably
the most difficult property to identify and to compel transfer, the pro
posed judgment creditor's lien would protect the creditor from the
debtor's ability to transfer or hypothecate such property. Other parties
dealing with the debtor would know that their interests are at risk.
However, two types of property deserve special attention: investment
securities and intangible property governed by federal law.
Investment securities are "share[s], participation, or other inter
est [s] in. . . property or an enterprise of an issuer"64 and the transfers
of securities are governed by Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. 6l1 Corporate stock, for example, is an investment security gov
erned by Article 8. Corporate securities can be either certificated or
uncertificated. Article 8 requires seizure of the stock certificate for cer
tificated securities and legal process in the issuer's office for uncertifi
cated securities in order for creditors to obtain any interest in such
securities. 66 In the MJLA, I propose leaving the current rule in place
with regard to conflicts between buyers of securities and judgment lien
creditors. With regard to conflicts between parties claiming a security
interest in securities and judgment lien creditors, I propose that the
statewide filing system be given effect for un certificated securities.
With regard to conflicts between various judgment lien creditors, I pro
pose that the filing system be given effect for both certificated and un
certificated securities.
64. u.c.c. § 8-102 (1995).
65. The vast majority of states, including the leading corporate states of Delaware, New York
and California have adopted the revised version of Article 8 which is discussed in this article. See 2C
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 278-79 (1991). In 1994, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws adopted a revised U.C.C. 2C UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 30 (1991 & Supp.
1995). Few states have adopted the revisions. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 47-8101 to -8511 (Supp.
1995); 1995 Ark. Acts 425; Idaho Code §§ 28-8-101 to -511 (1995); 1991 Ill. Legis. Servo P.A. 89
364 (West); 1995 Ind. Legis. Servo 152-1986 (West) (effective July 1, 1996); 1995 La. Sess. Law
Servo 884 (West); 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Servo 194 (West); 1995 Neb. Laws 97; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
12A, § 8-101 to -511 (Supp. 1995); Or. Rev. Stat. § 78.1010 to .S110 (Supp. 1995); 1995 Tex. Sess.
Law Servo 962 (Vernon); 1995 Wash. Legis. Servo 48 (West); W. Va. Code § 46-8-101 to -51l
(Supp. 1995.
66. U.C.C. § 8-317(1) (1991) (§ 8-112 of Revised U.C.C.).
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Buyers. The rule requiring seizure of the stock certificate for cer
tificated securities and legal process in the issuer's office for uncertifi
cated securities, in order for judgment creditors to obtain any interest
in such securities, is primarily designed for the protection of purchas
ers.1I7 The rule with regard to buyers is sound, particularly given the
ease with which debtors and securities can cross state lines. lls
Secured Creditors. With regard to the rights of secured parties,
the current rule certainly seems justified in the case of certificated se
curities. Secured creditors must obtain possessionll9 or obtain a signed
security agreement and give value70 in order to obtain a security inter
est in certificated securities; but for the security interest to be perfected
they must ordinarily obtain possession. 71 No filing is necessary to per
fect the security interest. 72 With regard to uncertificated securities
there are a variety of ways to obtain a security interest including the
"registered pledge," in which notice of the assignment is given to the
issuer.73 The structure of the revised version of Article 8, particularly
with respect to uncertificated securities, does not provide a great deal of
protection for those who contemplate taking a security interest. 74 Nev
ertheless, the lien creditor can only obtain a lien on the security by
legal process at the issuer's chief executive office in the United States. 75
If the judgment is in a state other than the one where that office is
situated, then a legal proceeding must be instituted in the office state.
Therefore, with respect to certificated and uncertificated securities,
the MJLA could revise priorities by making secured creditors subject
to judgment liens which arise prior to the attachment of the security
interest. Secured creditors certainly can be expected to search for such
liens. As indicated previously, the primary purpose behind the restric
tions placed on lien creditors was to protect purchasers, not secured
creditors. Given that a better argument can be made for continuing the
approach of Article 8 with regard to certificated securities rather than
uncertificated securities, I am proposing that the MJLA retain the Ar
67. 2C VNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 427 (1991).
68. The buyer is protected as a "protected purchaser" under MJLA §§ 1(g)(vii), 4(a)(ii).
69. V.C.C. § 8-313(1)(a) (1991) (§ 8·301(a)(I) of Revised V.C.C.).
70. V.C.C. § 8·313(1)(i) (1991) (§ 9·203(1) of Revised V.C.C.).
71. V.C.C. § 8·321(2) (1991) (§ 9·115 (4) of Revised V.C.C.).
72. V.C.C. § 8-321(3)(a) (1991) (§ 9-115(4)(6) of Revised V.C.C.).
73. V.C.C. § 8·108 (1991). See §§ 9·203,9·301, 9·303, 9·304, 9·305, 9-306, 9·309, and 9
312 of Revised V.C.C.
74. See ELDON H. REILEY. GUIDEBOOK TO SECURITY INTEREST IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
§ 14.08[3][e] (1994).
75. V.C.C. § 8·317 (1991) (§ 8-112 of Revised V.C.C.).
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tide 8 approach for the former,7s but substitute an approach similar to
that used with regard to aircraft for uncertificated securities. Specifi
cally, MJLA requires that for purposes of uncertificated securities, a
judgment lien could defeat a secured creditor if the judgment lien is
recorded in the statewide judgment lien filing system of the state of the
principal office of the issuer.77 It is not particularly burdensome to ex
pect secured creditors, unlike buyers, to check state filing systems. Also
the judgment lien creditor, unlike the secured creditor, is entitled to a
lien on all securities in which the judgment debtor has an interest. The
burden is then on the debtor to satisfy the judgment in order to main
tain good title to all securities. In order to avoid difficulties caused by
the fact that title to securities is controlled by the state of the issuer,
the reform proposed in the MJLA is designed to be effective only for
securities issued by corporations in states which have adopted the
MJLA.7S
Judgment Creditors. While the proposed MJLA makes changes
only in the priorities of the judgment lien creditor vis-a-vis the secured
creditor with regard to uncertificated securities, it changes the rules for
priorities of the judgment lien creditor vis-a-vis other judgment lien
creditors for both certificated and uncertificated securities. Unlike the
purchaser or the secured creditor, the judgment lien creditor does not
rely on the debtor owning specific securities when engaging in transac
tions with the debtor. The tort victim, for example, does not lie down in
front of the debtor's truck because the debtor had Microsoft stock in
her portfolio. Similarly, the supplier or unsecured lender does not rely
on specific securities. Therefore, there is no need to ground their prior
ity on the basis of which judgment creditor had given notice to the
issuer of the securities or had possession of the securities.
Basing the judgment lien creditor's priority on the date of judg
ment (or date of filing in the state system) has two significant addi
tional advantages for the judgment lien creditor. First, the judgment
lien creditor will be able to defeat a subsequent bankruptcy trustee or
debtor in possession in bankruptcy. The MJLA judgment lien creditor
would not be vulnerable to lien avoidance in bankruptcy because her
76. MJLA § 4(a)(ix).
77. MJLA § 4(a)(x). Section 9 provides the procedure for the judgment creditor to obtain the
document to file. Note that although § 9(c) provides for a hearing to obtain the order that is filed in
the sister state, such an order could be requested and issued with the judgment. The requirement of
the order will allow the court, if requested at the time of judgment or at a later date, to specify
specific securities of which the judgment creditor may be aware.
78. MJLA § 4(x)(B)(II).
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lien could not be defeated by another judicial lien creditor. 79 The sec
ond major advantage for the judicial lien on securities under MJLA is
that a subsequently filed federal tax lien would be subject to the judg
ment lien creditor. SO
5.

Intangible Property: Intellectual Property

Another financially significant form of intangible personal prop
erty is intellectual property: patents, trademarks and copyrights. Intel
lectual property is largely governed by federal law.
Originally, in the case of intellectual property, a court would not
compel the execution of copyrights or patents because of the strong
public policy favoring the promotion of artists' and inventors' ingenuity
took precedence over creditors' rights. sl Patents and copyrights were
also afforded "immunity" against creditors, because of their intangible
nature. S2 However, during the past century, courts have begun to con
sider creditors' rights more seriously and to compel involuntary trans
fers of intellectual property.S3 Ownership rights must be transferred in
79. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1), (2) (1988).
80. 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (a) (1988). For purposes of the tax lien act a judgment lien is not
perfected (and therefore superior to the tax lien) unless the "identity of the lienor, the property
subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are established." 26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(h) (1988).
This restates the "choateness" doctrine which had been used to restrict the liens which had priority
over the I.R.S. The MJLA lien clearly meets the first and third parts of the test but there could be a
question regarding the second since the lien applies to all property of the debtor not just specific
items of property. However, the one federal court which has dealt with this issue has concluded that
such a lien is choate for these purposes. Asher v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 22, 26 (N.D. Ill.
1976), affd, 570 F.2d 682 (7th Cif. 1978). Moreover, the regulations support that conclusion. The
regulations require that with regard to real property only that the judgment lien must be recorded so
as to be superior to all third parties. But that requirement does not apply to personal property. The
only part of the regulation relevant to personal property states that, "If under local law levy or
seizure is necessary before a judgment lien becomes effective against third parties acquiring liens on
personal property, then a judgment lien under such local law is not perfected until levy or seizure of
the personal property involved." 26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(h) (1988) (emphasis added). It might be
argued that the term "lien" applies to secured creditors and hence the protection of secured creditors
with regard to certificated securities would jeopardize the judgment lien's priority as to certificated
securities. "Lien," however, is not defined in the regulations, but also is not used to describe security
interests.
81. See Ager v. Murray, 105 U.S. 126 (1881) (holding property without body may not be
executed upon by marshall or sheriff, but creditor may be able to reach property through a bill of
equity).
82. Lieurance, supra note 26.
83. See Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934) (holding creditors may
garnish choices in action and other intangibles). See also McClaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refracto
ries Co., 138 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1943) (holding debtors' intellectual property could be transferred to
creditors by means of fieri facias); Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d
Cir. 1963) (holding the "first sale" that terminates the exclusive right of a patent or copyright holder
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accordance with federal law in the case of copyrights,84 patents85 and
trademarks. 86 Federal law regarding the transfer of interests in such
property would preempt state lien statutes.
The provision of the Copyright Act of 1976 which provides for
transfers of ownership rights to a copyright does not explicitly author
ize the creation ofjudicialliens on copyrights, but it does provide that
interests in a copyright may be transferred by "operation of law."87
This indicates that copyrights are susceptible to the entire range of
state creditor remedies. 88
The Patent Act provides only for transfer of ownership of a patent
by the applicant, patentee, his assigns, or legal representatives by
means of an "instrument in writing."89 However, the term "legal repre
sentatives" has been interpreted to include a court appointed officer.90
Further, like the transfer provision for copyrights, the patent transfer
section also explicitly refers to patents as personal property,91 thus im
plying the applicability to state lien laws.
Trademarks,s2 unlike patents and copyrights, hold no inherent
value in and of themselves. 93 Instead, the significance associated with a
trademark is dependent upon the business, service, or product with
which it is associated. 94 Therefore, the provision dealing with the as
signment of trademarks, § 1060 of the Lanham Act, the federal trade
mark statute, allows for the assignment of a trademark only "with the
goodwill of the business in which the mark is used, or with that part of
need not be truly voluntary, but can be reasonably compelled by a court); Lantern Press, Inc. v.
American Publishers Co., 419 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding a compulsory transfer may
be considered a "lawful transfer" if compelled by a court). Cj Baltimore & O.R.R. Co. v. Hostetter,
240 U.S. 620 (1916).
84. 17 U.S.C. §§ 201, 205 (1988).
85. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
86. 15 U.S.c. § 1060 (1988).
87. 17 U.s.C. § 201{d) (1988).
88. Also, because transfer by inheritance is explicitly referred to, the only other meaning that
"operation of law" could have is transfer by bankruptcy or judicial lien. That section also refers to
copyrights as personal property which under most state lien statutes, would be subject to execution.
Moreover, § 201 (e) deals with involuntary transfers through Title 11 bankruptcy proceedings which
makes it apparent that the drafters of the Act considered the allowance of court-compelled transfers
for the benefit of debtors.
89. 35 U.S.c. § 261 (1988).
90. McClaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 138 F.2d 493, 500 (3d Cif. 1943).
91. 35 U.s.C. § 261.
92. The discussion also includes "service marks."
93. VISA, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat'j Bank, 696 F.2d 1371, 1375 (Fed. CiL
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826 (1983).
94.

[d.
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the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and symbolized
by the mark."91S Most states also have enacted their own trademark
laws. If there is conflict between the transfer provisions of the federal
and state laws, federal law preempts the state law. As a result, the
state transfer provisions are almost identical to the Lanham Act. 96 Like
patents, the transfer of trademarks also must be by an "instrument in
writing duly executed."97
Although most states provide that "all personal property" is sub
ject to execution, the intangible nature of intellectual property renders
it impossible for a sheriff to seize and sell. 98 Seizure and sale of the
object (for example a book) does not constitute sale of the copyright or
patent. 99 Therefore the primary method for obtaining a lien on personal
property is not really available in the case of intellectual property. The
judgment creditor must resort to a procedure whereby the court assists
the creditor in obtaining control over the property. Such "supplemen
tary procedures" may involve compelling the debtor to execute a trans
fer or appointing a receiver to execute such a transfer. loo These may be
difficult to obtain because of preliminary equitable requirements, per
sonal jurisdictional requirements, and substantive additional require
ments, such as proof of fraud.
The question is presented, therefore, whether a lien which arises
on judgment alone, such as proposed in this article, could attach to
federally established intellectual property, and whether such a lien
could bind future purchasers, secured parties, and unsecured creditors.
Although a sheriff can not seize the intellectual property, a court can
convey the authority to do so to an appropriate officer. lOl Since under
MJLA the judgment creates a lien on all personal property, the MJLA
is therefore infusing in the money judgment a court ordered seizure of
an' interest in the debtor's intellectual property. This, coupled with the
15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1963) (amended 1988) (emphasis added).
PROF. CODE § 14260 (West 1987); MD. CODE ANN., Bus.
REG. § 1-411 (1984); NY GEN. Bus. LAW § 365 (McKinney 1984).
97. NY GEN. Bus. LAW § 365 (McKinney 1984).
98. See Farina, 25 B.R. at 41 L
99. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C § 202 (1988). Accord Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.s. (14
How.) 318 (1852) (sale of engraving at execution sale does not convey copyright); Kingsrow Enter.,
Inc. v. Metromedia, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (execution sale of films and copyright
certificates conveys no rights in copyrights). In this way, intellectual property is distinguished from
those intangibles where seizure of the writing evidencing the property right constitutes seizure of the
obligation itself. See supra note 62.
100. See Farina, 25 B.R. at 411.
101. See Ager, 105 U.s. at 132 (decree appointing trustee to execute assignment was within
the chancery powers of the court).
95.

96. See generally CAL. Bus. &
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copyright act's provision for the transfer of the rights by "operation of
law," indicates that the judgment lien provided for in the MJLA un
doubtedly encompasses any rights in copyright which the debtor has.
Since the Patent Act only provides for transfers in writing, the argu
ment for the applicability of the judgment lien is not as clear. Never
theless, the statute's explicit statement that patents have the attributes
of "personal property" could be argued to indicate that they are also
subject to personal property rules of the various states to the extent
they do not conflict with the federal statute. 102
Trademarks present the most troublesome case for applicability of
the judgment lien. The statute requires written assignments and does
not contain the additional language, as does the patent statute, regard
ing trademarks having the attributes of property rights. The proposed
treatment of intellectual property in the MJLA is as follows: Copy
rights and patents would be treated differently than trademarks. With
regard to copyrights and patents, the lien arises with the judgment.
That lien, however, is subject to the priority rules contained in the rele
vant statutes103 and those statutes require a recordation of the transfers
with the Register of Copyrights or Patent and Trademarks Office.
Therefore, MJLA provides a mechanism for the judgment creditor to
obtain a court order that can be filed in the appropriate office. 104 This
102. Paul Heald, Resolving Priority Disputes in Intellectual Property Collateral. 1 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 135, 140-41 (1993).
103.

With regard to copyrights, the statute provides that:

Priority Between Conflicting Transfers - As between two conflicting transfers, the one exe
cuted first prevails if it is recorded, in the manner required to give constructive notice under
subsection (c), within one month after its execution in the United States or within two
months after its execution outside the United States, or at any time before recordation in
such manner of the later transfer. Otherwise the later transfer prevails if recorded first in
such manner, and if taken in good faith, for valuable consideration or on the basis of a bind
ing promise to pay royalties, and without notice of the earlier transfer.
17 u.s.C. § 20S(d) (1988).
With regard to patents, the statute provides that:
An assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or
mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and
Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent
purchase or mortgage. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
104. MJLA § 9. The requirements of a court order recognize the inherent differences between
the intangible property involved and the tangible property governed by current state procedures.
Since there is no point at which the debtor can actually see the property leaving her control and
coming under the jurisdiction of the court, the procedure provides a way to be sure that the debtor
has appropriate notice and an opportunity to contest the seizure. That order can be requested and
issued along with the money judgment itself. See supra note 77. Moreover, the procedure provides
the creditor with an appropriate document that can be filed in the proper federal office. Finally, the
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order, combined with the fact that a lien arises on judgment, overcomes
the dual problem of needing a transfer to record and needing a writing
evidencing that transfer. To the extent that a creditor has priority
under the federal statute, the creditor would have priority under
MJLA. Essentially, once the order is filed, the judgment creditor would
have priority over all subsequent purchasers and secured creditors. The
result would be different with regard to judgment lien creditors depend
ing upon whether a patent or copyright was involved. In the case of
copyrights, the language of the copyright act that the filing require
ment protects all "transferees" (since judgment lien creditors are trans
ferees) means that the first judgment lien creditor to file would have
priority.IOIi Since the relevant patent provision only protects purchasers
and mortgagees,106 the lien established by MJLA on patents would
have priority over all subsequent judgment lien creditors without recor
dation in the federal office. 107
The consequence of this is illustrated by the following hypotheti
cal. D has a patent on a process for cold fusion. On January 1, X ob
tains a judgment against D in state A (which has a statute similar to
MJLA). On January 2, Yobtains a judgment against D in state B
(which has a statute similar to MJLA). On January 3, Y records at the
patent office. On January 4, X records at the patent office. X's lien
would have priority. But note that if Y sells D's patent to Z at an exe
cution sale, prior to the time X records, Z (as a purchaser) would pre
vail. Since the patent statute provides X a three month grace period
from the date of conveyance, if the sale to Z took place on February 1
and X records her lien March 25, X would prevai1. 108
Since a trademark has no real independent value, but is a symbol
of a company's goodwill,Io9 and cannot be assigned "in gross,"110 the
proposed statute provides that the lien does not arise until the tradeprocedure gives the creditor a way of assuring both the sheriff and the buyers that an appropriate
and meaningful sale is taking place.
105. 17 U.S.C. § 205(d), (e) (1988).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
107. Note that MJLA § 4(a)(xii) only refers to purchasers and mortgagees.
108. MJLA § 4(a)(xii).
109. VISA, U.S.A., 696 F.2d at 1375.
110. Id. An assignment "in gross" is one where a trademark owner attempts to transfer his
rights in the trademark in and of itself, without any transfer of the business which the trademark
represents. However, an exception to this rule does exist. If the trademark is transferred to someone
whose product and/or services are sufficiently similar to those of the trademark owner's business,
and the use by the transferee will not mislead consumers of the established associations of the trade
mark, then the transfer will be upheld. Id. at 1375-76. See also Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927 (2d
Cir. 1984).
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mark is sold at an execution sale.1l1 By adopting this procedure, MJLA
provides the creditor with a practical method to satisfy its judgment
where the debtor owns intellectual property. The statute nonetheless
respects the vagaries of federal law which controls and affords purchas
ers and secured parties with appropriate notice.

B.

Foreign Judgments

The local federal court. Judgments of the federal district courts
sitting in the state will be subject to the proposed system only if the
state law treats those judgments exactly like state court judgments. ll2
Two situations must be considered. The first is where the federal dis
trict court judgments are computer searchable in a way consistent with
those of the state court. In such a case, MJLA need only provide that
the federal court judgments be treated exactly like state court judg
ments.1l8 The second is where federal district court judgments are not
searchable in a way consistent with the MJLA. The question arises as
to what extent the state statute can make the lien of the federal court
in some way dependent on the federal court clerk or the judgment cred
itor filing some notice of the judgment in the state system. Since
MJLA requires the state clerk to enter the data into a searchable
database,114 the requirement that the federal court clerk do the same
would seem to fit within the statutory prescription that whenever a
state court judgment must be recorded in a particular manner, a simi
lar requirement applies to federal judgments if the state authorizes the
111. MJLA § 4(a) (xiii).
112. The United States Code provides that:
Every judgment rendered by a district court within a State shall be a lien on the property
located in such State in the same manner, to the same extent and under the same conditions
as a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction in such State, and shall cease to be a lien in
the same manner and time. This section does not apply to judgments entered in favor of the
United States. Whenever the law of any State requires a judgment of a State court to be
registered, recorded, docketed or indexed, or any other act to be done, in a particular manner,
or in a certain office or county or parish before such lien attaches, such requirements shall
apply only if the law of such State authorizes the judgment of a court of the United States to
be registered, recorded, docketed, indexed or otherwise conformed to rules and requirements
relating to judgments of the courts of the State.
28 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988) (emphasis added).
113. MJLA § 2(b) (Alternative A). Since the federal statute provides that judgments are
liens "under the same conditions" and "cease to be a lien in the same manner and time" as state
court judgments, all of the MJLA provisions regarding the requirements contained in MJLA § 3
would be applicable to federal court judgments. It should be noted that Federal Courts are rapidly
automating and making docket searches available through the PACER system.
114. MJLA § lOeb).
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recording. l l & That "requirement" is contained in Alternative B of
MJLA section 2(b).116
Sister state judgments. States must give the judgments of the
courts of sister states "full faith and credit."117 If the state which en
acts MJLA recognizes the sister state judgment through the procedure
of the judgment creditor suing on the judgment, the judgment creditor
will obtain a lien by virtue of the judgment on the judgment. H8 Many
states have adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act, which replaces the procedure of suing on the judgment with the
procedure of merely recording judgments. lUI In those states, the lan
guage of that statute to the effect that the "clerk shall treat the judg
ment in the same manner" as a judgment of the state court,120 requires
that the clerk should record the foreign judgment in accordance with
MJLA section 10. The language that the filed judgment has the same
effect of a judgment of the state in which it is filed l2l leads to the result
that the lien provided for in MJLA section 2(a) arises. Nevertheless,
since a state court judgment would never actually be rendered, section
8(b) is added to be sure that the intent is clear.
Foreign country judgments. Judgments of foreign countries are
not entitled to full faith and credit. In some states, a judgment creditor
with a judgment from a court in a foreign country must sue to obtain a
judgment in the United States which can then be enforced. However,
115.
116.
could not
117.

28 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). See supra note 112 (quoting precise text).
Strictly speaking, there is no requirement that the clerks take such action. The state law
require action on the part of the federal clerks. It is, however, a requirement for a lien.
The United States Constitution provides that:

Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Man
ner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
118. MJLA § 2(a).
119. See UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OR JUDGMENTS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 9 (1995) (listing those
states which have adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act as: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Geor
gia, Hawaii. Idaho. Illinois, Iowa. Kansas. Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mis
sissippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York. North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Okiahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania. Rhode Island, South Carolina.
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wis
consin and Wyoming).
120. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT § 2, 13 U.L.A. 154 (1995).
121. The Uniform Act provides that, HA judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject
to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment
of a [District court of any city or county] of this state and be enforced or satisfied in like manner."
ld.
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many states have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition ActY.l2 That Act provides that judgments of foreign coun
tries should be treated the same as judgments of sister states. 12lI There
fore, foreign country judgments simply can be recorded to create a lien.
Although the statute explicitly denies this status to judgments rendered
in countries that do not have impartial tribunals, where there was no
personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or where there was procedural
unfairness. 124 There is currently no procedure explicit in the statute re
quiring court review of the foreign country judgment before recording.
However, at least one court has held that recognizing foreign country
judgments without such a court review is unconstitutional. 126 Texas has
modified the Act to include a procedure which may provide for consti
tutional safeguards while still giving the Act the force and effect which
was intended by the drafters. 126 MJLA makes allowance for a similar
122. See generally UNIFORM MONEy·JCDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1995)
(listing those states which have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money·Judgments Recognition Act as:
Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Massachu·
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington). See also ALASKA
STAT. §§ 09.30.100-.180 (1972); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1713 (West 1967); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-62-101 to -109 (West 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. A:SN. §§ 50a·30 to -38 (West 1988);
GA. CODE ANN. § 9·12-110 to ·117 (1975); IDAHO CODE §§ 10·1401 to ·1409 (1990); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/12-618 to ·626 (Smith-Hurd 1963); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 6268.1-.8 (West
1989); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-701 to ·709 (1963); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
235, § 23A (West 1966); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1151-.1159 (West 1967); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 548.35 (West 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 511.770·.787 (Vernon 1984); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 25-9-601 to ·609 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 39·4B-l to -9 (Michie Supp. 1991); N.Y. CIv.
PRAC. L. & R. 5301-5309 (McKinney 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ lC·1800 to 1808 (1993); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.90·.94 (Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 710-718 (West
1965); OR. REV. STAT. § 24.200-.255 (1977); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 22001·22009 (1990); TEX. CIV.
!'RAC. & REM. CODE A..c'iN. §§ 36.001·.008 (Vernon 1981); V.l CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 561·569
(1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01·465.6 to .13 (Michie Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 6.40.010-.915 (West 1975).
123. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEy·JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3 (1986).
124. Id. at § 4.
125. See Plastics Eng'g Inc. V. Diamond Plastics Corp., 764 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989); Detamore v. Sullivan, 731 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
126. Texas has modified the Act to include a procedure which may provide for constitutional
safeguards while still giving the Act the force and effect which was intended by the drafters. TEX.
Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.002·.004 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995). Texas does not auto·
matically give full faith and credit to the foreign country judgment. Instead, a creditor must first file
an authenticated judgment with the court clerk in the county where legal effect is sought. ld.
§ 36.0041. Second, the creditor shall file with the clerk an affidavit showing the name and last
known addresses of the judgment debtor and judgment creditor. ld. § 36.0042. Third, either the
clerk or the judgment creditor mails notice of the filing to the debtor. ld. §§ 36.0042·0043. Fourth,
the debtor is given an opportunity to contest the state's recognition of the foreign country judgment,
within thirty days of receiving the filing. ld. § 36.0044(a). Fifth, the debtor shall file a motion of
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procedure, but also explicitly provides an avenue right for the judgment
debtor to have the lien notice removed if, for example, there was some
defect in the foreign country procedure. ill7
IV.

JUDICIAL LIENS WHICH ARISE OTHER THAN BY JUDGMENT

Pre-judgment attachment is an extraordinary remedy through
which the plaintiff may deprive the defendant of property before any
court has found liability on any grounds. All states limit the availabil
ity to pre-judgment attachment to lawsuits based on particular grounds
such as fraud,128 and to situations in which the plaintiff may be partic
ularly vulnerable to a defendant's secreting or dissipating assets, such
as where the defendant has evaded service of process or is likely to
abscond from the state. us Pre-judgment attachment also provides the
plaintiff with an advantage over other parties who may sue the debtor:
the effective date of the judgment lien which the plaintiff eventually
obtains will relate back to the date of the pre-judgment attachment. lao
In addition to granting the plaintiff the security that the property will
be available to satisfy the judgment, pre-judgment attachment provides
the plaintiff with considerable leverag~ over the defendant. The defend
ant, while being denied the use of some essential item of his property, is
more likely to settle on favorable terms with the plaintiff.
By incorporating pre-judgment attachment into the proposed sys
tem, increased flexibility is offered to the courts, plaintiffs, and the
debtor. It would be possible to extend the scope of a pre-judgment at
tachment to all property that the defendant owns. But it would also be
possible for the courts to grant the plaintiff a pre-judgment attachment
without the sheriff actually taking possession of the property where spe
cific property is to be bound by the attachment. In both cases, purchas
ers and secured creditors would have notice of the limitation of the title
nonrecognition of the judgment, along with any documentation which supports his contest, based on
grounds set forth by the Act. Id. § 36.0044(b). The debtor may request an evidentiary hearing on
the matter, and the court may grant or deny such a request in its discretion. [d. § 36.0044(e). The
court will then decide whether or not to refuse recognition of the judgment. [d. § 36.0044(g).
127. MJLA § 8(c)(ii).
128. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-303(e) (1995) (debt incurred by
fraud, home improvement violation); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 6201(3) (McKinney 1980 & Supp.
1995) (sister state judgments, recovery of damages for commission of crime).
129. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-303 (1995) (action to evade service,
absconding debtor, fraudulent disposition of property); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 6201 (McKinney
1980 & Supp. 1995) (inability to personally serve, fraudulent disposition of property).
130. See, e.g., State v. Friedman, 283 Md. 701, 393 A.2d 1356 (Md. App. 1978).
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which the defendant can convey.l3l Where the plaintiff can establish
that this is not sufficient protection, the court could enjoin the defend
ant from conveying or misusing the property, or, if necessary, the court
could authorize seizure of the property.132
The doctrine of lis pendens functions similarly to a pre-judgment
attachment of land. The doctrine provides that if the pleadings explic
itly place title to land at issue, any interests in the land that arise after
the initiation of the lawsuit are subject to the court's decision in that
law suit. 13s This device provides constructive notice to purchasers of the
land, thus, guaranteeing the creditor's priority over such buyers. In
many states, a notice must be filed in the land records to enforce the
doctrine. 134 In others, the filing of a notice is not necessary. Purchasers
and mortgagees need to consult court dockets for pending lawsuits
against their transferors. 136 The doctrine would survive under the pro
posed system, but it may be necessary to continue to require that a
specific notice be filed,ISG unless all law suits in the state are searchable
in the statewide system. IS7
V.

A.

MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS

Transition to a New System

The duration of judgment liens is generally between eight and
twelve years. ISS Due process may require that creditors with liens that
arose prior to legislation providing for the establishment of the MJLA
system maintain their liens on real property for the balance of the
131. MJLA § 6. Alternative A would be available in those systems in which the entire court
docket is available for search and not just the judgments themselves.
132. Barry Zaretsky, Attachment Without Seizure: A Proposal for a New Creditors' Remedy,
1978 U. ILL. L.F. 819, 825 (1978).
133. Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 670 F.2d 1316 (3d Cir. 1982).
134. See, e.g., COl'l'N. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52·325 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).
135. See. e.g., Permanent Financial Corp. v. Taro, 526 A.2d 611 (Md. App. 1987).
136. MJLA § 7 (Alternative B).
137. Id. (Alternative A). Two counties are experimenting with systems in which the actual
filing of documents can be done by modem from the lawyer's office. Other documents in those pro
ceedings would be scanned electronically and available in a search of the court records. Arleen
Jacoius, Two More Courts Add Electronic Filing, 81 A.B.A. J. 20 (Sept., 1955). In such a system,
even Lis Pendens could operate without any additional notice filing.
138. See ALA. CODE § 6-9-211 (1990) (10 years); CAL. CIV. PROC, CODE § 697.310 (West
1987 & Supp. 1994) (10 years); CONN. GEN. STAT, ANN. § 52·380a (West 1991) (20 years); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 624.23 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (10 years); MD. CODE ANN" CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 5-102 (1993) (12 years) & MD, RULES § 2-625 (1993); N.Y, CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 5203(a) (Mc
Kinney 1978 & Supp. 1994) (10 years). Cf ME. REV. STAT, ANN, tit. 14, § 3132 (West 1980) (until
satisfied); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 511.360 (Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1994) (3 years).
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judgments' lives. lall Of course, those creditors will maintain their out
standing liens. However, after the effective date of the statute, all ac
tion must be taken in compliance with the statute. Moreover, the pro
posed statute provides for those judgment creditors who have obtained
judgments prior to MJLA's effective date to record their judgments in
the new system in order to take advantage of the statewide and ex
panded property coverage of the new system. l40

B. Search Efficiency
The establishment of and reliance on a state-wide database will
present problems of both "overinclusiveness" and "underinclusive
ness. "141 The "overinc1usiveness" involves two aspects. First, some
names may be very common and thus a search by a prospective lender
or buyer of property would turn up a large number of records. 142 The
inclusion of additional identifying information in the database at the
time the judgment is rendered would be a partial solution to this prob
lem. These include the debtor's address, date of birth and social secur
ity or tax identification number. Such information already is included
as a matter of course in some systems . 143 With this additional informa
tion a person can easily eliminate many, ifnot all, of the extraneous
results of the search. Where the identifying information is not included
in the record of the judgment, the law could require judgment creditors
to obtain and supply such information. MJLA includes such a require
ment in section 3(a). It should be noted that the proposal requires that
139. In the text I refer to protecting only those liens arising prior to the legislation and not the
institution of the proposed system. Presumably, after the system is legislated but before it is in place,
judgment creditors would be on notice as to the necessity of filing with the new system.
140. MJLA § 2(d).
141. For a discussion of search problems and potential solutions in the context of potential
computerization of V.C.C. filings, see Lynn LoPucki, Computerization of the Article 9 Filing Sys
tem, 55 L. & CONTEMP. FROB., 5, 19-29 (Summer 1992).
142. A search of California judgments in LEXIS turned up 388 debtors named Jim or James
Jones. Fortunately only one appeared under Charles Shafer. The "All Judgments" file in LEXIS
(which includes all of the states covered by LEXIS) turned up 573 John Smiths and only 27 Charles
Shafers.
143. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 674 (West Supp. 1993). Filing of the abstract without such
information and no explanation will invalidate the judgment lien, since the creditor has not "substan
tially complied with statutory formalities." Id. See Keele v. Reich, 169 Cal. App. 3d 1129, 1133
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding strict compliance with statutory guidelines is required). See also
McKnight v. Faber, 185 Cal. App. 3d 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
A number of states require inclusion of the Tax Identification Number in V.C.C. Article 9
filings. Edward S. Adams, et aI., A Revised Filing System: Recommendations and Innovations, 79
MINN. L. REV. 877, 899 (1994).
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the judgment creditor supply such information within one year. There
fore any judgment older than one year for which such information is
not available would not be protected by the lien. For those cases where
the requirement of identifying information does not completely elimi
nate the problem that the prospective buyer or lender cannot be sure
that her prospective transferor is not one of the parties against whom a
lien is established, the proposed statute provides a mechanism for the
lender or buyer to contact the judgment creditor. The creditor's cooper
ation is guaranteed by the available sanction of "suspending" the
lien. 144
The problem of "underinclusiveness" is created where the search
under the name of an individual or corporation does not turn up a rele
vant judgment. This could be caused by either changes in the name of
the debtor or slight variations in spelling. The latter problem now can
be easily solved since a reasonable search would include all likely spell
ings of the debtor's name. 145 However, in cases where the debtor
changes her name after the judgment, the problem is more compli
cated. There are, however, a number of factors which will limit the
problem. If the debtor is an individual and has legally changed her
name, the judgment in such a case would be found by the computer
search. If the debtor is a corporation that has changed its name, and if
state corporate records were also searchable in the proposed system,
such a name change would be located. If the debtor retains the same
social security number or tax identification number, a search by social
security number would locate appropriate judgments. Finally, where
property is subject to a title recordation system (such as land and intel
lectual property), the lien against the debtor will often be revealed. For
example, suppose A gets a judgment against D while Downs Blackacre
or before D acquires Blackacre. Subsequently, D changes her name to
Q and reconveys Blackacre to herself under the name of Q. The title
search of Q will produce record of D's ownership and the judgment
search of D will produce A's lien. This would not be true if D had
acquired the property under the name of Q. There would be no way for
a purchaser of real property to find D in the chain of title. Further
144. MJLA §§ 3(a), (b), (c), (d).
145. My first name, Charles, could also be Chuck or Charlie. My last name is spelled by
students as Shaffer, Schaefer, Schaeffer or Schafer. The search software could be easily constructed
to search for all possible variations at once. In fact it could have a thesaurus of alternative spellings
of many names. There is software already available that assists in searching for all words that sound
like a particular word. Jacob R. Jacobs, Finding Words That Sound Alike: The Soundex Al
gorithm, BYTE, March, 1982 at 473.
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more, if intellectual property were involved, there is a possibility that
the property could be owned by D at the time she was going under the
name of D but never recorded under that name. It is not necessary to
register a copyright in order to have a copyright. 146 Registration is per
missive. 147 Therefore, if at the time A gets a judgment against D, D
had written a book entitled "The Three Faces of D," A, by making the
appropriate filings, would have a lien against D's copyright to that
book. But if D then changes her name to Q and registers the copyright
under the name Q, a potential buyer of that copyright could find no
record of A's interest.
Therefore, in those situations where an appropriate search could
locate the judgment creditor's interest, the judgment creditor should
not be defeated by the judgment debtor's change of name. These in
clude situations where the search will locate official name changes or
where a search by social security number would locate the lien. The
judgment creditor should also be protected where the debtor's name is
included in a title search of property. In the remaining situations the
question is raised regarding how to allocate the risk of the change in
the debtor's name. The U.C.c. provides that where the debtor materi
ally changes her name, filing becomes ineffective with regard to collat
eral acquired more than four months after the change. 148
The proposed system adopts this solution with the following excep
tions. 1411 First, where a search by tax identification number or social
security number would locate the judgment, the lien is retained. Sec
ond, where the original name can be located in the chain of title for
real property or intellectual property, the lien is retained. Third, the
lien is only ineffective against those who obtain an interest in the prop
erty before the judgment creditor eventually records the change of
name. Fourth, the protection only applies to secured creditors and pur
chasers. Subsequent judgment liens against the debtor under her new
name would be subject to the prior recorded lien under the old name.u;o
This deviation from the V.C.C. is based on the fact that judgment
146. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
147. [d. § 108.
148. V.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1995).
149. MJLA § 4(a)(ix).
150. Of course, the original judgment creditor would still take the risk that the property would
be seized and sold by the subsequent judgment creditor without anyone knowing that original judg
ment creditor had an interest in the property. See MJLA § J(g)(viii). If the original judgment
creditor intentionally allowed the debtor to operate under a new name and only later revealed her
interest after others had become creditors of the debtor, such conduct would be penalized under
MJLA § 4(a)(xv). Such conduct would be similar to a fraudulent conveyance buy would not be
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creditors have not relied on the presence of clear title to specific prop
erty in the same way as secured creditors and purchasers have. Finally,
the proposed statute does not distinguish between property acquired
before and after the change of name as does the U.C.C. While a se
cured creditor's protection is specifically derived from the fact that she
is allowing the debtor to retain specific property, the judgment creditor
should be encouraged to locate and seize property in a diligent manner.
The judgment creditor cannot claim to have placed reliance on the
debtor owning specific property. Therefore, in this context, as opposed
to the secured creditor context, it is not necessary to grant the original
judgment creditor increased protection for property acquired prior to
the change of name.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Modern technology could be a useful vehicle for overhauling the
system for the enforcement of judgments. This article has illustrated
some of the advantages of such a system, the problems that would be
encountered in attempting to bring about that overhaul, and how these
problems might be resolved.
APPENDIX
PROPOSED MODEL JUDGMENT LIEN ACT

§ 1 Definition of Terms
As used in this statute
(a) Buy means to acquire an interest in property (other than a lien or
security interest) for consideration in money or money's worth.
(b) DEBTOR means a party against whom a money judgment is
rendered.
(c) INVESTMENT SECURITY means a security under [STATE REFER
ENCE TO 8-102(c) of U.C.C.]
(d) JUDGMENT CREDITOR means
(I) a party in whose favor a money judgment is rendered, and
(II) an assignee of the rights of a judgment creditor
(e) LIEN means a right to have property sold in satisfaction of a judg
ment by any of the following procedures: [INSERT STATUTORY
REFERENCES TO ALL STATE PROCEDURES]
voidable under thc Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act because the transfer (the lien) occurs prior to
the fraudulent conduct. UNIF, FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS ACT § 4.

326

JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 15:295

(f) PROPERTY means all rights to property in this state or the situs of
which is not in any particular state or country including (but not lim~
ited to) all real property, personal tangible and intangible property, intellectual property, choses in action, stock and other ownership interests, and accounts receivable whether or not the transfer of such
property is governed by the laws of this state or depends on actions
taken outside of this state.
(g) PROTECTED PURCHASER means
(i) A person who buys in the ordinary course of business and for
less than $5,000 tangible personal property from a merchant who deals
in goods of that kind.
(ii) A person who buys for personal, family or household use property the transfer of which must be recorded under the following statutes of this state: [INSERT STATUTES] where the lien provided for
under this title has not been so recorded.
(iii) A person who buys for less than $5,000 property the transfer
of which must be recorded under the following statutes of this state:
[INSERT STATUTES] where the lien provided for under this title
has not been so recorded.
(iv) A person who buys or obtains a security interest in property
governed by federal law where such law provides a separate place for
the filing or recording of transfers of such property and where under
such law the buyer or secured creditor has priority over the holder of
the lien provided for under this title.
(v) A person who buys personal property for personal, family or
household use without knowledge of the lien created by this title other
than property the transfer of which must be recorded under the following statutes of this state: [INSERT STATUTES] where the lien provided for under this title has not been so recorded.
(vi) A person who obtains an interest in property from a protected
purchaser.
(vii) A bona fide purchaser of an investment security under
[STATE REFERENCE TO 8-302 OF U.C.C.], a holder in due course
of a negotiable instrument under [STATE REFERENCE TO 3-302
OF U.C.c.] and a holder to whom a negotiable document has been
duly negotiated under [STATE REFERENCE TO 7-502 OF THE
U.C.C.].
(viii) A purchaser at a properly conducted execution sale.
(h) Purchase Money Security Interest means a security interest of personal property or a mortgage of real property to the extent that it is
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(i) taken or retained by the seller of the property to secure all or
part of its price; or
(ii) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an
obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the
use of the collateral if such value is in fact so used.
(i) Security Interest means any interest in property to secure payment
of an obligation governed by: [INSERT STATUTORY REFERENCE
TO ARTICLE 9 AND STATE REAL PROPERTY MORTGAGE
LAW].
U) A JUDGMENT is
(i) RENDERED when [REFER TO ACT OF COURT
REQUIRED]
(ii) ENTERED when [REFER TO ACT OF CLERK REQUIRED]
§ 2 Creation of a Judgment Lien
(a) A lien on all property of the debtor, then owned or after acquired,
to secure satisfaction of the judgment shall arise upon the rendition of
a money judgment of the [LIST COURTS OF STATE] which is entered after [EFFECTIVE DATE OF STATUTE].
(b) ALTERNATIVE A: A lien on all property of the debtor, then
owned or after acquired, to secure satisfaction of the judgment shall
arise upon the rendition of a money judgment of the [FEDERAL
COURTS SITTING IN THIS STATE] which is entered after [EFFECTIVE DATE OF STATUTE].
ALTERNATIVE B: A lien on all property of the debtor, then owned or
after acquired, to secure satisfaction of the money judgment of the
[FEDERAL COURTS SITTING IN THIS STATE] which is entered
after [EFFECTIVE DATE OF STATUTE] shall arise upon the recording of a notice thereof in a database searchable through the
software required by § 11 of this title.
(c) Notwithstanding any other statute of this state, no lien which arises
by virtue of any court order, judgment, execution, or the filing of notice
of a court order, judgment, or execution, and which would not be effective but for any act not taken before [EFFECTIVE DATE OF STATUTE], shall arise unless action is taken in compliance with this title.
(d) A person who has a money judgment from any court of this state or
who has imported into this state a money judgment from any other
state, country or federal court may obtain a lien on all property of the
debtor within this state by filing a notice of said judgment in compliance with the rules set forth in § 3(a).
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(e) A lien obtained by this statute shall be effective as of the date of
rendition of the said judgment.
(f) A lien obtained by this title shall be effective against all after-acquired property of the debtor.
(g) No judgment lien, whether or not obtained under this title, may be
renewed other than under this title.
(h) A lien which arises under this title shall expire when the statute of
limitations has expired on the judgment upon which the lien is based,
unless the judgment is revived prior to the expiration of the statute of
limitations.

§ 3 Procedure for Creating & Maintaining a Judgment Lien
(a)(i) A lien obtained under § 2(a) of this title shall expire one year
after the lien arises if the judgment creditor does not file a statement as
set forth in subsection (b) of this section where the information is not
contained therein is not already included in the database required by
§ 10 of this title.
(ii) A lien may not be obtained under any section of this title other
than § 2(a) unless the judgment creditor files a statement as set forth
in subsection (b).
(iii) A lien obtained under this title shall lapse if the creditor's
address changes and notice of such change is not filed with the clerk of
any Circuit Court within thirty (30) days.
(b) When required by this title, the judgment creditor shall file with
[CLERKS OR OFFICES WITH WHICH INFORMATION MUST
BE FILED] the following information, or a sworn statement indicating
why such information is not available:
(i) Debtor's current name;
(ii) Debtor's Social Security Number or Tax LD. Number;
(iii) Debtor's Date of Birth;
(iv) Debtor's last known address;
(v) Judgment creditor's name;
(vi) Creditor's current address; and
(vii) Sworn statement by the creditor that the judgment is valid,
enforceable, and unsatisfied.
(c) The judgment creditor must respond within thirty (30) days to any
person who seeks to determine whether a particular person is or is not
the debtor.
(d) Any person may petition [NAME OF COURT] for an order declaring any lien created by this title suspended where the judgment
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creditor has failed to respond as required by subsection (c) of this
section.
(e) The judgment creditor may petition [NAME OF COURT] for an
order reviving a lien suspended by subsection (d) of this section.
(f) Any person may petition [NAME OF COURT] for an order declaring a lien arising under this title void by reason of the satisfaction
of the judgment, the expiration of the lien under § 2(g) or discharge in
bankruptcy.
(g) The judgment creditor may petition [NAME OF COURT] for an
order reviving a judgment.
(h) (i) Where the judgment debtor so changes his name that the lien
under this title could not be discovered upon a reasonable search the
judgment creditor must file a revised statement within four months of
the date the debtor adopts the new name.
(ii) If the judgment creditor does not comply with the requirement
subsection (h)(i), all property owned by the judgment debtor shall be
deemed protected until the judgment creditor so complies.
(iii) The following property is not protected: All real property and
intangible property subject to a federal recording system where the
debtor's ownership is recorded.

§ 4 Priority of Claims
(a) The lien provided for in this title shall be effective against the
debtor, all creditor's of the debtor and all parties who claim any interest in the property of the debtor except for
(i) Judgment creditors with liens which arose prior to the time of
the lien in question;
(ii) A protected purchaser;
(iii) A purchase money security interest;
(iv) A person with regard to whom the judgment creditor has not
responded as required by § 3(c) of this title and who's interest in the
property arose after the time for such response has past;
(v) A person who had a security interest in personal property
under [STATE REFERENCE TO ARTICLE] which defeats a lien
creditor;
(vi) A person who had a mortgage in real property under [STATE
STATUTORY REFERENCE] which defeats a lien creditor prior to
the date on which the lien in question arose;
(vii) A possessory lien created by [STATE STATUTORY
REFERENCE] ;
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(viii) Any interest in property acquired after the lien was suspended under § 3(d) of this title and before the lien was revived under
§ 3 (e) of this title;
(ix) A person with a security interest in a certificated investment
security who has priority over a lien creditor under 8-321 and Article 9
of the U.C.C.;
(x) A person with a security interest or a judgment lien in an investment security who has priority over a lien creditor under 8-321 or
Article 9 of the U.C.C. unless
(A) The chief executive office of the issuer is in this state, or
(B) (I) The chief executive office of the issuer is in a state which
provides for the filing of judgment liens, and
(II) The lien in the investment security has been filed prior to the
time that the judgment lien in question was filed in that state.
(xi) A person with an interest in a copyright who has priority
under 35 U.S.C. § 261;
(xii) A purchaser or mortgagee of a patent who has priority under
17 U.s.C. § 205(d);
(xiii) A person with an interest in a trademark which arises prior
to the sale of the trademark at an execution sale or a judicial sale;
(xiv) A person who buys or obtains a security interest in property
while it is protected by § 3(h) of this title;
(xv) A person who becomes a creditor of while the property is protected by § 3(h) of this title if the judgment creditor knows of the
change of name.
§ 5 Statute of Limitations of a Judgment Lien
(a) [INCORPORATE STATE STATUTE OF LIMITATION]
(b) No renewal or revival of a judgment shall create a lien under this
title unless the judgment creditor files a statement as forth in § 3(b) of
this title.

§ 6 Pre-JUdgment Attachment
(a) ALTERNATIVE A: For states where complete docket information
is searchable: A person may obtain a lien under this title on all of the
property of another person, or upon specific property by obtaining a
pre-judgment attachment.
(b) ALTERNATIVE B: For states where complete docket information
is not searchable:(i) A person may obtain a lien under this title on all
of the property of another person, or upon specific property by ob-
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taining a prewjudgment attachment and filing said order [INSERT
WHERE FILING MUST BE MADE].
(ii) A pre-judgment lien shall be shall be subject to the rules set
forth [INSERT STATE STATUTORY REFERENCE].
§ 7 Lis Pendens Notices
(a) Where a plaintiff is entitled to protection of the doctrine of lis
pendens, a lien shall be created under this title.
(i) ALTERNATIVE A: For states where complete docket information is searchable: as of the date of the commencement of the law
suit.
(ii) ALTERNATIVE B: For states where complete docket information is not searchable: by filing notice thereof [INSERT WHERE
FILING MUST BE MADE]

§ 8 Foreign Judgments
(a) Upon the filing [INSERT WHERE FILING MUST BE
MADE]of an out-of-state federal court judgment a lien shall arise
under this title.
(b) Upon the filing of a foreign state judgment [INSERT WHERE
FILING MUST BE MADE] a lien under this title shall arise.
(c)(i) Upon the filing of a judgment of a foreign country [INSERT
WHERE FILING MUST BE MADE] a lien under this title shall
arise. However, the judgment creditor shall not be entitled to proceed
against any property of the debtor until the creditor has complied with
the provisions of [INSERT STATE STATUTE].
(ii) Any party in interest may move in [INSERT NAME OF
COURT] for removal of the notice filed under subsection (c) (i) of this
section for good cause.
§ 9 Property rights controlled or created by other jurisdictions
(a) Where federal1aw or the law of another state provides a separate
place for the filing or recording of transfers of particular types of property, any creditor may obtain an order from the [STATE FILLS IN
APPROPRIATE COURT] authorizing the creditor to file a notice of a
lien created by this title. Such notice shall include a copy of the court
order.
(b) The court shall issue such order only after a hearing upon notice to
the party against whom the transfer is alleged.
(c) The order may specify the particular property in which the creditor
claims an interest.
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(d) The order shall authorize the sheriff to sell the debtor's interest in
the property.
(e) To the extent that federal law governs the priority of interest in
property such law shall govern the priority of liens established under
this title.
(f) In the case of the execution of a state or federal trademark, the
purchaser first must be:
(i) in the business of sufficiently similar products and/or services;
and
(ii) transfer of such trademark must not lead to consumer confusion as to the established associations of the mark.
§ 10 Creation of Searchable Database
(a) The [INSERT NAME OF STATE OFFICE] shall create or otherwise obtain software which is capable of searching under the name of
any person in all of the Databases provided for in this section and locating the following information about that person:
(i) All judgments which create liens under § 2(a) of this title.
(ii) All notices provided for under § 2( c) of this title.
(iii) All notices provided for under § 3(b) of this title.
(iv) ALTERNATIVE A: All court orders provided for under
§ 6(a) of this title.
ALTERNATIVE B: All filings provided for under § 6(a) of this
title.
(v) ALTERNATIVE A: All pleadings which may establish a right
to the doctrine of lis pendens.
ALTERNATIVE B: All filings provided for under § 7(a) of this
title.
(b) The [INSERT TITLES OF CLERKS OR OTHER OFFICERS]
shall enter into a database all of the items specified in Subsection (a) of
this section.
(c) The [INSERT TITLES OF CLERKS OR OTHER OFFICERS]
shall remove from the database or shall identify as purged a record of a
judgment where the lien has expired under § 3(a) of this title or has
been declared void under § 3(f) of this title.
(d) The [INSERT TITLES OF CLERKS OR OTHER OFFICERS]
shall remove from the database or shall identify as suspended a record
of a judgment where there has been an order suspending the lien under
§ 3(d) of this title.
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(e) The [INSERT TITLES OF CLERKS OR OTHER OFFICERS]
shall enter into the database or shall identify as revived a record of a
judgment where there has been an order reviving the lien under § 3(e)
of this title.
§ 11 Availability of Software and Terminals
(a) [Provision that terminals for searching the databases required by
§ 10 should be available in courts of the state]
(b) [OPTIONAL: Provision that software should be made available so
that any person can search the databases from a remote location, i.e.
dial up by modem].

